(a) The Formal Mechanical Process: Section 3
Coming To Rest
The previous section concluded the moments of action and reaction with the
moment of rest &mdash undoubtedly, another nod to Newton’s laws of motions,
though this time to the first law of motion. What exactly the connection is
between Newton and Hegel in the development of the formal mechanical process
is a fascianting topic that deserves further attention. Focusing on the logical
development, however, the object comes to rest because it has expelled the
determinateness that was communicated to it because of its indifference to any
determinateness. As such, the object has shown the process of communication to
be entirely superficial since it did not affect the object beyond engaging it to
react to the communicated determinateness with indifference. The moment of
rest is when the mechanical object has expelled the determinateness, and
returned into itself. In other words, the object’s determinateness went out of
itself through communication, it collided with other objects in action and
reaction, and the object has returned to being itself by expelling this
determinateness entirely. The moment of expulsion is the moment of indifference
and self-subsistence of the object. Now, this moment of returning into itself is
crucial for Hegel because it acts as the moment when the concept as a totality
has been posited.
The Product Of The Formal Mechanical Process
Prior to the formal mechanical process, the determinations of the concept
where immediately identical, indeterminate, and indifferent to each other. We
asserted that there was an essential determinateness between them, that they
were fundamentally bound together by virtue of being the determinations of the
concept – but it was such a superficial connection because there was no active
connection between them. But through the formal mechanical process, we saw how
each determination developed into the other – we saw how communication as
universality developed into action and reaction as particularity, which in
turn developed into rest as individuality. The explicit development of these
determinations demonstrates that the concept is now posited as a totality – as
the explicit unity of these three determinations that are indifferent and
external to each other. This mechanical object is the product of the formal
mechanical process as the object for which the indifference and externality to
determinateness is posited as the essential relationship between the
determinations of the concept. This positing also brings the
mechanical object into the sphere of necessity, and out of the contingency of
the opening of Mechanism. Suffice it to say, that Hegel sees the
product of the formal mechanical process as heralding the moment of necessity
into Mechanism, and that the basic conceptual reason for this is connected to
the fact that the determinations of the concept are now mediated through
themselves. This reflection into itself makes the objects in the mechanical
process more determined.
The establishment of the product of the mechanical process is the hinge-point
for the transition into the real mechanical process. The objects within the
mechanical process now stand in a more determinate relationship to each other.
That means a few things: One, it means that they are no longer immediately
identical. At the beginning of Mechanism, there was no difference between the
moment of universality and the moment of particularity. But through the
formal mechanical process, the mediation of the concept, there is at least a
formal distinction between these determinations of the concept. Two, the
object is no longer indeterminate but has the opposition that is latent in it as
its determinateness. As such, what it is for the mechanical object to be is
for it to be in an oppositional relation to other mechanical objects. Three, and
this follows from the first two, the object is no longer simply indifferent to
determinateness. The conclusion of the formal mechanical process is that we
have a mechanical object that is in an oppositional relationship to other
mechanical objects and is no longer simply indifferent. It is self-subsistent in
the sense that its determinateness is not connected to or dependent on anything
external to it, but it is now embedded into a more relational state with other
objects. The object is in a state where what it is, is much more open to
alteration by the external determinateness of other objects than it previously
was.
Let’s consider our example of the moral belief, “thou shalt not kill”. We begin
with it as the universal determinateness that is immediately communicated
amongst mechanical objects. We then saw how that belief is immediately
particularised into a particular belief, i.e. as a belief that is held by
particular mechanical objects. The particularisation of the belief determined
the mechanical object into an active object that is in a particular relation
to other mechanical objects. The active object posits another
mechanical object with its particular determinateness, i.e. a particular
citizen expresses the moral belief to another citizen, and the second
mechanical object becomes the reactive object. The particular citizen
receives the moral belief and recognises it as being identical to its own
determinateness and, further, posits the same determinantess in another
mechanical object, thus expelling the determinateness. Here, we might imagine
a citizenry as it is described in 1984, by George Orwell. A citizenry of
mechanical objects is one of unreflective individuals who are merely acting and
reacting to each other. Nobody contributes anything new to the belief, it is
just repetitively shared. The reactive object, then, upon expelling this
belief comes to rest, in the sense that the citizen who communicated the
belief in turn, is now no different to how they were before. The movement of the
determinateness has been a tautology. The citizens are at rest in the sense
that there is no further communication of the moral belief and, more profoundly,
in the sense that the communication of the moral belief has not led to any
change in their own determinateness. We move from rest to the
real mechanical process when we make explicit the fact that the
formal mechanical process developed the mechanical objects into a more
determinate relation. Whilst it is still the case that the expression of the
moral belief from citizen to citizen is a mere tautology, it is also true that
the belief needed to be communicated, and that it was actively and reactively
posited from citizen to citizen. The sheer fact of this takes the
mechanical object into a more oppositional relationship to other mechanical
objects and this is what takes us into the real mechanical process.
Authors
Ahilleas Rokni (2025)
Editors
Filip Niklas (2025)
