(a) The Formal Mechanical Process: Section 1

The Mechanical Process in the Science of Logic consists of two headings: (a) The Formal Mechanical Process and (b) The Real Mechanical Process. In this article, I will deal with the first section of (a) The Formal Mechanical Process.

The section begins with the following: “The mechanical process is the positing of what is contained in the Notion of mechanism, and therefore, in the first instance, of a contradiction” (Hegel 1991, 716). The “concept” of Mechanism is the logical moment with which the section, A. The Mechanical Object finished. The mechanical object is now a negative unity: the negativity of having the identical determinateness to other mechanical objects whilst being indifferent to them. This is the contradiction with which A. The Mechanical Object concludes. This contradiction is now explored further in the (a) The Formal Mechanical Process.

Above, Hegel writes that it is the “positing” of the contradiction in the mechanical object that gets the mechanical process started and it is worth dwelling on this for a moment. Hegel explains that by “positing” he means,

It follows from the Notion just indicated that the interaction of objects takes the form of the positing of the identical relation of the objects. This consists merely in giving to the determinateness that is determined, the form of universality; this is communication, which does not involve transition into an opposite (Hegel 1991, 716).

Thus, the “positing” is an expression of the logical interaction of objects that relate to each other as identical. But where has this logical interaction come from? If we cast our minds back to the conclusion of A. The Mechanical Object section-3 we will recall that the contradiction was more specifically conceptualised as a negative unity. This negativity is the interaction of the mechanical object with another mechanical object – whereby a mechanical object has both an identical determinateness to another mechanical object, whilst being indifferent to it.

The negativity of the contradiction, then, logically unfolds as the positing of their identical determinateness. At this point, one might legitimately ask: why is the first positing that of their identity and not that of their indifference to each other? The answer must be: because it is their identity that binds them into a relation with one another. It is because they have an identical determinateness that there is a negative unity in the first place, and it is because of their identical determinateness that an interaction can take place. Thus, the identical relation is posited.

The logical result of this positing is that the identical determinateness of the mechanical objects is itself determined. In other words, the logical structure of that identity is posited and in being posited is hardened (determined) into an actual moment between mechanical objects. Their identity is no longer just one side of a contradiction, but it has its day in the Sun, it is determined as a moment of what it is for the mechanical object to be in a formal mechanical relation with another mechanical object.

Accordingly, because their identity is determined, their relation takes the form of a universal – there is nothing other than mechanical objects and these mechanical objects relate to each other as identical.¹ Hegel calls this communication and, crucially, adds that it “does not involve transition into an opposite” (Hegel 1991, 716).

The communication between mechanical objects is a movement of identical determinations, and so strictly speaking, there is no change from one thing to something different. It is quite simply the identical determinateness that exists between mechanical objects – a kind of ether of determinateness that connects all objects together but does not affect them beyond connecting them.

Communication Between Objects

Hegel then embarks on a remark that helpfully unpacks what he has in mind with the logical determination of communication. He writes:

Spiritual communication, which moreover takes place in that element which is the universal in the form of universality, is explicitly an ideal relation in which a determinateness continues itself from one person into another unimpaired, and universalizes itself without any alteration whatever-as a scent freely spreads in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in communication between material objects, their determinateness spreads, so to speak, in a similarly ideal manner; personality is an infinitely more intense impenetrability [Harte] than objects possess (Hegel 1991, 716).

The above paragraph provides a series of concrete instances of communication. Crucially, the examples given are all of the kind of communication that occurs between objects; Hegel makes the point to distinguish the kind of communication between objects to something like personality, which “is an infinitely more intense impenetrability [Harte] than objects possess” (Hegel 1991, 716). This is an excellent opportunity to look closely at Hegel’s examples as they provide a window into how he thinks about the real-world instances of the logical development. If we spend a bit of time unpacking Hegel’s examples and scrutinising their validity, we will get a clearer understanding of communication its its technical sense and ontological status.

Beginning with Hegel’s first example, that of a scent diffusing in an atmosphere where there is no restriction on the diffusion of the scent. Why does Hegel think that this is a helpful example of how communication is exemplified in everyday life? At first glance, it makes sense. The way a scent freely diffuses itself around an atmosphere so that the whole atmosphere smells of the scent is reminiscent of the identical determinateness of the mechanical object that leads to it becoming a universal. However, how exactly are we supposed to understand this? Is the mechanical process at work between the scented molecules and the non-scented molecules, or is it just between the scented molecules? To pose this question is, I think, to overstep the conceptual restrictions of Mechanism and mechanistic thought. The distinction between a scented molecule and a non-scented molecule does not obtain within a mechanistic framework because, as mechanical objects, they do not have different determinations (i.e. one is scented and the other is non-scented). Quite simply, scented molecules and non-scented molecules have an identical determinateness.

What the above example provides us with, is a way of thinking about the abstract logical structure of communication in a concrete way. The diffusion of the scent is the unimpeded movement of the identical determinateness of mechanical objects and the fact that a scent will diffuse throughout a room and thus universalises itself within the room - in the sense that the scent can be smelt throughout the room. As such, Hegel’s account of communication gives a philosophical explanation for why a scent diffuses through a room. Note, a philosophical explanation does not seek to provide the material causes for why a scent diffuses in a room. It explains what the (onto-)logical reasons for scent diffusion are. These ontological reasons are: all of the particles in a room are treated as the same, they are all mechanical objects; and the diffusion of the scent, then, is explained by the fact that the particles share an identical determinateness - they are identical.

A final note. This does not supplant a materialist explanation. Nor is it merely a description of what is going on. The ontological reasons exist side-by-side the materialist causes. The ontological reasons provide the conditions under which the material causes can then find expression in the world. It is only because particles or mechanical objects are identical to each other that the diffusion of a scent in external reality can occur. Because, it is a philosophical position to conceptualise all objects as identical - it is not self-evident from the diversity of objects that we see around us.

Interlude: How does the Science of Logic relate to External Reality? (Rokni)

A further philosophical conundrum poses itself. Above, I said that the distinction between a scented molecule and a non-scented molecule does not obtain within a mechanistic framework. This mode of thinking about how the logical determinations are reflected in everyday occurrences suggests that the same object can be thought of within a mechanistic framework, as well as other frameworks. Take the human body,for example, one could conceive of it purely in mechanistic terms and theorise of its processes in terms of cause and effect, or one could conceive of it in organicist terms and conceive of its processes differently. Now, what is crucial about this example is that it works because mechanistic thinking is more reductive than organicist thinking – the reverse would not be possible. One could not conceive of a rock within an organicist framework. Thus, the possibility of an object to be conceived within a plurality of frameworks requires that the object is open to reductionism.

Now, a further thought. This does not mean that it is equally correct to conceive of the same object through the prism of multiple frameworks. The human body is an organic thing and so to conceive of it as a mechanical object is to misconstrue it. It can be done but you are failing to fully grasp what it is a for a human body to be what it is. Let us hold onto this reflection and turn back to the example of the diffusion of scent. Since we are within the realm of Mechanism, the simplest way that we have to conceive of the scented and the non-scented molecules is as mechanical objects².

The Ideality of Communication

Looking at the second half of the first paragraph of (a)The Formal Mechanical Process, Hegel writes that: “But even in communication between material objects, their determinateness spreads, so to speak, in a similarly ideal manner” (Hegel 1991, 716). When talking about the diffusion of scent amongst molecules one might get the false impression that communication is the kind of process that only works with ideal, non-material objects. Now, It looks as if in Hegel’s time scent was thought to be transmitted in a non-material way. Obviously, this is no longer the case, but Hegel’s point is clear: communication is an ideal process that occurs between material objects. In other words, it is not just material processes that occur between material objects. Here, Hegel is clearly going against a materialist/mechanistic worldview whereby the only processes are material processes. Perhaps Hegel is thinking of forces and, perhaps more specifically, the force of gravity as an example of communication.

At the end of this long paragraph where Hegel gives examples of communication, he expands on an important logical dimension of this moment. He writes:

The formal totality of the object in general, which is indifferent to the determinateness and hence is not a self-determination, makes it undistinguished from the other object and thus renders the interaction primarily an unimpeded continuation of the determinateness of the one in the other (Hegel 1991, 716).

Communication does not work simply because the determinateness between mechanical objects is identical but also because they are indifferent to determination. Their indifference means that the identical determinateness, in other words, the determinateness that is communicated, continues from one object to the other without any alteration in that determinateness. It just continues exactly as it did from the beginning. Thus, not only does communication begin from the identity of mechanical objects but it also continues with that identity throughout the interaction.

Hegel, then, concludes this section on communication with an analysis of how it functions in the “spiritual sphere” (Hegel 1991, 716). By spiritual sphere, Hegel has in mind the following: “Laws, morals, rational conceptions in general” (Hegel 1991, 716). There are laws in a society, and these laws pervade (are communicated) throughout society without any obstruction or alteration. The same with morals, what a society takes to be right or wrong is immediately communicated throughout the society and, again, there is no alteration of morality (on a social level) as it goes from individual to individual.³

How Communication is different to Intelligence

Let us have a look at the first sentence of this paragraph to get a better understanding of what Hegel is going for:

Now in the spiritual sphere there is an infinitely manifold content that is communicable; for being taken up into intelligence it receives this form of universality in which it becomes communicable. But the universal that is such not merely through the form but in and for itself, is the objective as such, both in the spiritual and in the material sphere; as against which the individuality of outer objects as well as of persons is an unessential element that can offer it no resistance (Hegel 1991, 716).

The paragraph begins with an example that does not fall within the purview of communication because it is concerned with “intelligence” (Hegel 1991, 716). Intelligence, then, does not fall within the logical remit of Mechanism. If we just focus on the text, however, intelligence has the effect of giving the form of universality to a content and thereby making it communicable. There are 2 logical steps to clarify here: (1) intelligence takes on a manifold content and gives it the form of universality – a capacity that intelligence has, and (2) intelligence is able to communicate the content because it has the form of universality, i.e. a communicated content, whether it be through the formal mechanical process or through intelligence, must be universalised in order to be communicated.⁴

This is in stark contrast to the kind of universalisable content that an intelligence can try to communicate. As we saw above, the content of an intelligence can be given the form of a universal, but the fact that it is not in-and-for-itself a universal means that its content can be resisted, i.e. I am not automatically within the remit of Kant’s conception of the moral law just because it has the form of universality – my individuality has the power to resist. It is not the case with the `formal mechanical process’ where resistance is not even an option. On a mechanistic conception of society, i.e. where citizens and political institutions are conceived of as mechanical objects that participate within the formal mechanical processes, there is quite simply total and an automatic acquiescence to the moral law and/or the law.

Bibliography

Authors
Ahilleas Rokni (2024)

Editors
Filip Niklas (2024)

Notes