The Development of Something and Other

The Other

Other is first determined at the end of the the development of something and the two now form a pair that progress the logic further. Before looking at that development, however, a semantic issue needs to be settled: is an other actually a category in its own right and not merely a reflection of something?

Both something and other are each determined as existents as well as something in its own right. An other is just as much a something in its own right. Their difference may appear to be merely semantic, such as a sentence ordering—for example, this bulletin is different from that other one—such that something and other are essentially the same (see Hegel 2010, 90-91/21.105-106). Hegel, however, claims that there is a logical difference between the two determinations, and that the other is a particular determination in its own right: “other, as posited at first, though an other with reference to something, is other also for itself apart from the something” (Hegel 2010, 91/21.106).

Hegel illustrates this in the common usage of nature, particularly as it is regarded as other of human self-conscious activity or spirit. At first, the determinateness of nature expresses a mere relativity—a something different from the matter at hand—but what is implied in this is not that the externality of nature merely exists within self-conscious thought as such, but that externality is a quality of nature itself: “taken for itself the quality of nature is just this, to be the other within, that which-exists-outside-itself” (Hegel 2010, 92/21.106).

Coincidentally, the term nature encompasses its own set of concepts which are each determined and developed through the primitives of space, time and matter—categories which are precisely further concrete elaborations on the theme of that which-exists-outside-itself. It is important to remember, however, that while nature may exemplify the idea of the other, the concept of the other does not logically depend on nature; one does not need to appeal to nature in order to conceptualize otherness. Hegel develops this concept of the other entirely out of the concept of something, immanently.

While it is not yet clear why other is a category distinct from something, a couple of clues may act as helpful stepping stones towards that understanding. First, there is a distinction to be made between a something that entirely and immanently develops from pure being and the something that is as the result of an other something. Second, the distinction between an immediate something and a mediated something holds—or, does not collapse—because the quality of being something means to have a being-within-itself or an internality, such that the two somethings cannot collapse into one. Instead, the two somethings must form a new difference vis-á-vis one another. Additionally, this new difference cannot be relational or a concrete unity, since that would require a third element to bind the other two, which would be presupposing too much. Rather, the difference must be contained within each something, perhaps as the feature of being something.

The Other of the Other

The other which is such for itself is the other within it, hence the other of itself and so the other of the other – therefore, the absolutely unequal in itself, that which negates itself, alters itself. But it equally remains identical with itself, for that into which it alters is the other, and this other has no additional determination; but that which alters itself is not determined in any other way than in this, to be an other; in going over to this other, it only unites with itself. It is thus posited as reflected into itself with sublation of the otherness, a self-identical something from which the otherness, which is at the same time a moment of it, is therefore distinct, itself not appertaining to it as something (Hegel 2010, 92/21.106).

Not only is the other a determinateness that applies with regards to something, two somethings (non-quantitatively) or something and other, but it also applies to the other as such. This yields the peculiar notion that an other is an other to itself. To phrase this using a different term: externality is external to itself.

This conception of the other of the other produces two absolutely contrary determinations. First, by virtue of being _other_, the inner other is completely unequal to the outer other, and since this determination is within the other, it essentially negates itself or, as Hegel puts it, alters (verändert) itself. Second, by the same token, the inner other is perfectly identical to the outer other since they are both equally other, such that the other thereby rejoins itself as it is. This movement of “othering” servers to change the other but what it changes into is nothing else than other again.

but that which alters itself is not determined in any other way than in this, to
be an other; in going over to this other, it only unites with itself.

The first instinct might be to conclude that no change took place in this “othering”. But reading Hegel carefully, it is understood that the first determination of the other of the other—that the inner and outer other are unequal—does in fact take place without reference to the second. The first determination thus is not dependent on the second for its validity, and so the second does not have the authority to revoke the determination of the first. Granted that the other is other to itself, the second determination necessarily follows from the first.

The second determination—that the inner and outer other are equal—does also in fact run completely counter to the first. It really does appear that a contradiction follows from the other of the other; but this precisely displays the movement of change itself whereby an element of difference and identity are necessarily both contained. In everyday parlance, this is readily grasped and accepted: it does not make sense to say a matter has changed if there is not some unity between its two states, but likewise it does not make more sense to say that there is no difference, since then there would be no different states to speak of. Change, it seems, must incorporate these two elements. What Hegel shows here is how change minimally develops from the “inside-out”, as it were, by thinking what logically follows from the idea of other when the category is turned upon itself.

Being-for-other

The something preserves itself in its non-being; it is essentially one with it, and essentially not one with it. It therefore stands in reference to an otherness without being just this otherness. The otherness is at once contained in it and yet separated from it; it is being-for-other (Hegel 2010, 92/21.106).

Being-for-other (Sein-für-Anderes) determines the state of something whereby it is connected to an other while also not merely being this other. One might say it is the “outward facing aspect” of something. This “aspect”, however, is internally part of what it means to be something such that it is not a determination externally imputed upon a something. It follows from the nature of something that it has a being-for-other.

Existence as such is an immediate, bare of references; or, it is in the determination of being. However, as including non-being within itself, existence is determinate being, being negated within itself, and then in the first instance an other – but, since in being negated it preserves itself at the same time, it is only being-for-other (Hegel 2010, 92/21.106).

Hegel elaborates further on this concept by looking briefly back at the development from existence. First, existence is determinacy that is maximally immediate or is in considered first and foremost in its being. It is not absolutely immediate since that is what pure being is, but maximally immediate in terms of what a being that is determinate. Second, with the growing emphasis on non-being that is necessarily part of existence, it is qualified as determinate being. Third, it is seen how this negative element forms a negation within itself insofar as it is regarded as a being whose determinacy is its own as something. Fourth, this something is an other. Fifth, and consequently the present situation, this other is negated (though the other of the other) but in such a way that preserves its being as other. The other here ceases to be merely other and gains a being that is “other-for-something”, or, as Hegel terms it, being-for-other.

In being-for-other, the determination of something is brought right back into play but in terms of the other. Put differently, determining something as being-for-other means that it has an existence that is for other in the double sense that it is, first, for “otherness” as such, and, second, that it is for an other something.

To illustrate, saying that the green apple appears in a certain way for me in such and such way is really mostly in part due to the human visual field with its particular sensitivity of the light spectrum etc., such that this determinacy from the standpoint of the apple belongs to the other, i.e., to the human observer. For another observer, the apply might look very differently! However, this other perspective cannot be wholly divorced from the apple in question. It really belongs to the apple, at least conceptually, to be determined in this way and picked up by an other, such that not everything about its determining as it appears for me is exclusive only to me (lest it be a hallucination – but then where did the first determinacy emerge from?).

Being-in-itself

It preserves itself in its non-being and is being; not, however, being in general but being with reference to itself in contrast to its reference to the other, as self-equality in contrast to its inequality. Such a being is being-in-itself (Hegel 2010, 92/21.107).

Being-in-itself (Ansichsein) is defined in contrast to being-for-other. Importantly, being-in-itself is not the immediacy of something or its “native” determinacy, but is specifically the determination that defines what belongs to something against the other. Where the being-for-other specifies what is open to the other, being-in-itself, by contrast, specifies what is closed to the other since it picks out what really belongs to the something in question. Where being-for-other brings an unequal level of determinacy into something—this something can be viewed in a plurality of different ways according to the eye of the beholder, as it were—being-in-itself clears the determinacy to be only what genuinely forms part of this something against the other.

Take, for example, the idea that a stone has a certain hardness. This quality, however, only makes sense from the perspective of someone who can touch and compare it to other things. For the stone in itself, there is no “hard” or “soft”—only a certain resistance to being scratched or dented.

Being-for-other and Being-in-itself

Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of something. There are here two pairs of determinations: (1) something and other; (2) being-for-other and being-in-itself. The former contain the non-connectedness of their determinateness; something and other fall apart. But their truth is their connection; being-for-other and being-in-itself are therefore the same determinations posited as moments of one and the same unity, as determinations which are connections and which, in their unity, remain in the unity of existence. Each thus itself contains within it, at the same time, also the moment diverse from it (Hegel 2010, 92/21.107).

Two pairs of determinations are at hand. The first designates the non-connectedness of something and other. Something is only an other implicitly, but explicitly it is in itself just something (and vice versa that other is implicitly a something). By spelling out this difference in terms of implied and explicit, the connection between these two categories becomes visible, such that the terms something and other are not sufficient alone to determine their connection.

The second pair, then, designates the connectedness of something and other. Specifically how each form moments of the same individual unity, namely, that the same something is also an other (and vice versa). The inwardness and “selfsameness” of something is recast as being-in-itself, designating that which holds its own and refers to itself. Conversely, the outward and self-negating dimension of the other, is established as being-for-other. The connection is made emphatic by the fact that the both terms employ being as the initial ground that diffracts into its “for-otherness” and “in-itselfness”, thus rendering each as moments of the same entity.

The extreme point of unity in the pair being-for-other and being-in-itself is just existence once more, since the logic cannot collapse further back than the category where at least two elements must co-exist (hence existence). But this point of unity is not really collapsed into since being-for-other and being-in-itself form a pair with something and other whereby each contains itself and its other.

Being-in-itself and being-for-other are determinations of something-and-other that emphasize their connection. However, these two determinations mirror each other in a peculiar way.

… being-in-itself is, first, negative reference to non-existence; it has otherness outside it and is opposed to it; in so far as something is in itself, it is withdrawn from being-other and being-for-other. But, second, it has non-being also right in it; for it is itself the non-being of being-for-other (Hegel 2010, 93/21.108).

Hegel points out that while being-in-itself excludes being-for-other, it nonetheless refers to it—one might say, presupposes it. But Hegel goes one step further and states that it is the non-being of being-for-other. This tight coupling of being and non-being is reminiscent of existence where these two form a oneness.

A similar situation seems to be the case for being-for-other:

But being-for-other is, first, the negation of the simple reference of being to itself which, in the first place, is supposed to be existence and something; in so far as something is in an other or for an other, it lacks a being of its own. But, second, it is not non-existence as pure nothing; it is non-existence that points to being-in-itself as its being reflected into itself, just as conversely the being-in-itself points to being-for-other (Hegel 2010, 93/21.108).

The connectedness and mutual reference of being-for-other and being-in-itself shows that neither exists without the other. There is no being-for-other that is purely for other, since the being it is sourced from is its own “othering”. The same conclusion applies to being-in-itself, where there is no inward being which does not also determine an outward being.

These conclusions may appear uncontroversial and innocent enough, but when turning to a more concrete reality, one often employs one without the other. One imagines that one’s inner life of emotions and feelings is entirely private—merely being-in-itself—but these invariably have an outward manifestation. Or that there is an absolute law of nature that merely exists in itself without reference to its expression in things. Or, conversely, that one can put up a certain manner of being pretending that is not who one is, for example, “this job is not who I am, it is only something I do while I wait for better things” or “I only do this to be nice to you, but it is not who I am”. Or that money only has an apparent, illusory value but no intrinsic value whatsoever. If Hegel is right, there really is no being-in-itself that does not also have a being-for-other and vice versa. The two point to one and the same concept.

Looking back at the development of the Logic, pure being has failed to be in its sheer immediacy. Instead, being exists in being determinate. This determinacy has now evolved to the point where it subsists as self-referring being or something. But this self-reference precisely excludes the other, rendering something in more precise terms as being-in-itself—the being that refers to itself through excluding non-being. But determinacy requires the element of non-being as a moment of the self-referring being. Indeed, where pure being fails to be, something succeeds by its ability to refer to itself by excluding—or negating—non-being from itself. This exclusion is the being-for-other that opens up the something’s being-in-itself. This concept applies no less to the entire logic itself up to this point. In other words, logic has a being-in-itself that is its own—it does not belong to any one human language, individual thought or symbolic expression—but it has a being that is presentable through all languages, thoughts and expressions—but the conclusion forces us to recognize that logic is only meaningful, paradoxically, in being negated.

Something Undivided

Both moments are determinations of one and the same, namely of something. Something is in-itself in so far as it has returned from the being-for-other back to itself. But something has also a determination or circumstance, whether in itself [an sich] (here the accent is on the in) or in it [an ihm]; in so far as this circumstance is in it [an ihm] externally, it is a being-for-other (Hegel 2010, 93/21.108).

Hegel here differentiates between, on the one hand, what something is in itself, without relation to anything else, and, on the other hand, something happening on or with respect to a specific thing. For example, Kant’s notion of Das Ding an sich (the thing in itself), designates the thing that is beyond our perception, merely as it is in itself. Conversely, man kann das an ihm erkennen (you can recognize that in him—or on him), points to something related to or happening with a particular thing—something in an other.

This leads to a further determination. Being-in-itself and being-for-other are different at first. But that something also has in it what it is in itself and conversely is in itself also what it is as being-for-other — this is the identity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, in accordance with the determination that the something is itself one and the same something of both moments, and these are in it, therefore, undivided (Hegel 2010, 93/21.108).

It was understood earlier that being-in-itself and being-for-other form part of the same something. Here Hegel emphasizes the point through the double meaning of in it (an sich and an ihm) which inheres in both determinations: First, in it (an sich) in the absolute sense signifies the being-in-itself of something—its own closed interior and exclusive ownership. Second, in it (an ihm) in the relative sense signifies the being-for-other of something—the determination of it open to others and, one might say, shared ownership. However, both terms are determinations of the same something or, by happy coincidence of language, share the same in it, and in that respect the same something inheres in both.

By virtue of this identity, what first appeared as different terms are in fact the same.

In the unity of the something with itself, being-for-other is identical with its in-itself; the being-for-other is thus in the something. The determinateness thus reflected into itself is therefore again a simple existent and hence again a quality – determination (Hegel 2010, 95/21.110).

Once it is understood that being-in-itself and being-for-other are of the same something—here something is regarded in its self-reference, or “unity with itself”—the terms converge since being-for-other does not exist apart from something but is immanent to it, and in that regard, it is equally its being-in-itself. Likewise, being-in-itself must also be an “expression” of something inasmuch as the interiority is distinguished vis-à-vis exteriority; but this expression precisely determined what belongs to the something in question, and so the determinateness of the exterior here is nothing separate from the interior and the two once more converge. In other words, insofar as something is concerned in pure terms of being-in-itself and being-for-other, the exterior is the interior and vice versa.

Reciprocal Determination? (Niklas)

By virtue of the identity in something, being-in-itself and being-for-other are different expressions of the same. However, Hegel’s transition may not be entirely exhaustive, since there remains the logical possibility that these terms reciprocally determine one another which may yield a different dialectical outcome.

First, it must be established that something in the development of the Logic proves have determinations that are expressed to others. Indeed, these determinations that are expressed to other are integral to the something actually having determinations of its own. Hegel criticizes Kant’s notion of a thing-in-itself since it stipulates a something that has no such expressed determinations, which is incoherent.

Things are called “in-themselves” in so far as abstraction is made from all being-for-other, which really means, in so far as they are thought without all determination, as nothing. In this sense, of course, it is impossible to know what the thing-in-itself is. For the question “what?” calls for determinations to be produced; but since the things of which the determinations are called for are at the same time presumed to be things-in-themselves, which means precisely without determination, the impossibility of an answer is thoughtlessly implanted in the question, or else a senseless answer is given (Hegel 2010, 94/21.109).

Therefore, something must have being-for-other. Something is a form of determinate being that not only specifies what determinacy minimally is, but what determinacy must minimally be in order to make available to others what really belongs to it, i.e. a determinacy that is split between its being-in-itself and being-for-other.

So, with the identity of the terms in mind, one can take it further since being-in-itself and being-for-other reciprocally determine one another insofar as each is a being-in-itself of the same something in forming moments of it, and, likewise, each is an expression, a being-for-other, of the same something insofar as they make available a determination of that something. Thus, both being-in-itself and being-for-other take turns, as it were, in being for another and being in itself for the being that has any determinations of its own. This does not, however, appear develop any new results, but repeats the pattern already established. If anything, it reinforces the identity of the terms such that neither can be the sole context of both itself and the other; such that a further determination lies at the seams.

The implications of this is not that being-in-itself and being-for-other are untrue or erroneous. However, they are erroneous if one is taken to be true without the other, that is, if one is held to be true unconditionally and absolutely. As Hegel shows in his critique of Kant, an incoherence exists immediately in the idea of a thing-in-itself, since one stipulates something that has no being-for-other, but this leaves out exactly the very determination thing-in-itself, such that there exists at least one determination, namely, the one that brings forth its being-in-itself.

Further Commentary

Houlgate

Stephen Houlgate emphasizes that while the term “other” has been used in the Logic up to this point, such as being and nothing each being unseparated from its other, neither of these (nor reality or negation) are actually other to each other. The other, Houlgate writes,

is not just simple negation … it is self-relating negation. Unlike negation, therefore the other is not merely one side of a difference: it is not bound to something in the way negation is bound to reality. Rather, the other stands apart from something as something separate from it, as something of its own (Houlgate 2022, 177).

Like reality and negation, something and other co-exist while being different, yet their difference is not merely two sides of the same difference (moments of a difference) but are self-relating distinctions. “Being other than something thus consists in being separate from it, not in being its simple negation” (Houlgate 2022, 177).

With regards to something and otheras such, Houlgate notes that a certain indeterminacy is at play. Neither is fixed as this something and not that. However, this indeterminacy is different from that of being and nothing as something and other do not vanish into one another but each are, rather, the other in being itself (see Houlgate 2022, 179).

However, a subtle shift has taken place. Other is a determination that not only applies to the other but can equally apply to something. The determination of other itself has become “alien” (fremd), belonging to neither. Houlgate continues:

This is because each is now a something and is determined to be other only by the presence outside it of its counterpart. Being other still means being a self- relating negation, that is, being the negation of something and yet standing apart from the latter as something in its own right. Now, however, neither of the somethings is intrinsically other, but each is other only because there is something for it to be other than. If, therefore, either – > per impossibile – were to be all on its own, it would not be an other, but would simply be self-relating being, or something. It is only the presence of a second something that turns each into an “other” (Houlgate 2022, 179).

This does not make other a contingent determination that something may or may not exhibit, Houlgate adds, but the other follows logically from being something. However, it is “only thanks to its other that something is an other itself”. As an aside, it does appear as if other is qualified upon the determination of the second something. This aligns with Houlgate’s conclusion that it belongs to the very nature of something to be one of (at least) two.

In the other relating negatively to itself, a new form of becoming becoming-other is made explicit. This new becoming is more aptly understood as change. Furthermore, it is discovered that this logical form of change does not presuppose time.

Houlgate points out that, through change, something gains stronger terms of differentiation vis-à-vis other. Since something now becomes understood to exclude otherness both within itself and outside itself. Because of this, Houlgate writes, “otherness now lies both within and outside the something, the latter is not-other, or not-the-other, in two senses: it is not the other or otherness that constitutes it, but also not the other that stands apart from it” (Houlgate 2022, 186). This is because, through the process of change, the other that is other to itself that proves to be something, becomes this new something not merely as an instance of that other's “othering”, such that the something at hand ceases to be purely other – it is more overtly negative – it is not just that other.

Two new senses develop from this. Firstly, something and other are no longer simply reversible. Now, Houlgate highlights, “something differs from being-other in such a way that the latter does not belong to it. Something is now definitely something, not other itself or the other outside it” (Houlgate 2022, 186). Secondly, the two categories are now more explicitly connected to each other. Something is no longer “something as such” but something-that-is-not-the-other; and the other, initially separate, becomes a connected moment of something. Something, Houlgate states, thus has a double-edged character: “it is both distinguished from and connected to the other by not being that other” (Houlgate 2022, 186-7).

From this, the implication that the other is built into something, the two thus stand in explicit relation. The name given to the fact that something is related to other is being-for-other. Here Houlgate notes that the preposition “for” does not indicate that something is at the disposal of the other or for the latter’s benefit, but, rather, a shorthand for “related-to”—“being-related-to-other”. Moreover, something is not related to an other because there is some other out there, but because other-relatedness is part of the nature of being something.

But something is also self-relating, in a way that is quite different and unconnected to the other, which is termed being-in-itself (Ansichsein). This is quite different from being-within-itself (Insichsein). “The latter is simply self-relating being, or something, as such; being-in-itself, on the other hand, is one aspect or side of something: something as self-related rather than other-related. Indeed, Hegel maintains, a thing’s being-in-itself is explicitly opposed to its other-relatedness” (Houlgate 2022, 188).

Further to being-in-itself, Houlgate comments that it is a subtle fusion of separateness and relatedness. For, on the one hand, being-in-itself expressly excludes all otherness and is the something that relates purely to itself. On the other hand, however, being-in-itself opposes relations to other, and by the virtue of this opposition remains related to being-for-other. This fusion is “expressed in the thought that being-in-itself is being that has ‘withdrawn from being-other and being-for-other’” (Houlgate 2022, 188, emphasis added). A withdrawal that cannot be logically separated from what it withdraws from.

Being-in-itself and being-for-other are each inextricably tied to one another in something, but unlike reality and negation in existence, these moments do not conceal each other but explicitly point to the other from which it is separate (see Houlgate 2022, 189). This forms the groundwork of a critique of Kant’s thing in itself.

Bibliography

Authors
Filip Niklas (2025)