The Development of Constitution
Externally Determined
The category constitution
(Beschaffenheit) is made explicit in the
development of
determination
and
concerns the outward being or being-for-other
that falls beyond the intrinsic
being—being-in-itself
—of
something
. Basically, it
concerns that part of the relationship that something has with others that it
does not govern or form part of its determination
.
Constituted in this or that way, the something is caught up in external influences and in external relationships. This external connection on which the constitution depends, and the being determined through an other, appear as something accidental. But it is the quality of the something to be given over to this externality and to have a constitution (Hegel 2010, 96/21.111).
Hegel makes clear that the fact that something
has external relationships
beyond its control—which appear for that reason as accidents—is not
itself an accident or something externally determined. It belongs to the nature
of something
to determine itself through relations with others, but that this
is a double-edged sword, so to speak, since it necessarily involves what is
determined by the other. For that reason, if something
has determination
, it
must therefore also be externally constituted
.
Change in Constitution
In so far as something alters, the alteration falls on the side of its constitution; the latter is that in the something which becomes an other. The something itself preserves itself in the alteration; the latter affects only this unstable surface of the something’s otherness, not its determination (Hegel 2010, 96/21.112).
When something
changes, according to Hegel, the change does not encompass the
entire thing. If that were so, it would simply be another thing and
effectively no change would really take place. Instead, a reference to
something
must be maintained for change to be meaningful. But, conversely, a
reference to what is utterly other
to something
must likewise be made, since
there is a new element that is at play which differentiates one state of
something
to another.
Hegel claims that this element of change is contained under the constitution
of the thing. For example, Arnold is in bad shape but decides to do something
about it and goes to the gym regularly to become fit. In this example, whether
in bad or good shape, Arnold is still the same person (the same something
),
however, something fundamental about Arnold really has changed; he demonstrated
his determination
to be healthy by exercising (or, conversely, taking his
health for granted by not exercising). Being in good or bad shape are rather
themselves contingent, as neither intrinsically belong to Arnold as such insofar
as Arnold is simply to be. These therefore form part of Arnold’s constitution
and is seen how his determination
is mediated through it.
Being-in-the-something
Hegel further develops the relation and difference between constitution
and
determination
, starting from how the latter is indifferent to the former.
Determination and constitution are thus distinct from each other; something, according to its determination, is indifferent to its constitution. But that which the something has in it is the middle term of this syllogism connecting the two, determination and constitution. Or, rather, the being-in-the-something showed itself to fall apart into these two extremes (Hegel 2010, 96/21.112).
Recall that something
has a outward being or a being that is related to others
(being-for-other
), and that this outward being is further subdivided into, on
the one hand, what is beholden to the something
(its being-in-itself
) in
question , and on the other hand, what is externally determined by other
.
These two outwardly related forms of being are respectively classed as
determination
and constitution
. Now, what connects the determination
and
constitution
? Hegel claims it is what the something
has “in it” that
connects these two and that is provisionally called being-in-the-something
.
But what really is such a being if not another something
?
At first, Hegel defines this being-in-the-something
generically as
“determinateness as such” (Bestimmtheit als solche):
The simple middle term is determinateness as such; its identity belongs to determination just as well as to constitution (Hegel 2010, 96-7/21.112).
Determinateness
, which presumably means it is minimally a form quality
, is
that in which both determination
and constitution
partake.
Hegel goes on to elaborate on the connection:
The connection, upon closer consideration, is this: in so far as that which something is in itself is also in it, the something is affected with being-for-other; determination is therefore open, as such, to the relation with other (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).
By way of simple inference, if determination
and constitution
are connected
by a point of identity, then the thing’s determination
not only points outward
from the thing itself, but that external reality also points inward into the
thing itself. The very determination
of a thing is exposed to being affected
by the other.
This implication found in determination
that it is open to be affected
externally aligns well with everyday intuitions about how things and people grow
and develop. It is ingrained in everyday thinking that what something is or who
someone is, depends in large part of outside influences. Indeed, where one is
born proves to constitute
either a formidable advantage or grave disadvantage.
Hegel claims to prove this to be the case, however, ontologically, such that
it forms not only part of historically lived, concrete reality but any being’s
determination
—including metaphysical categories, as well as
fundamental qualities of natural or social reality. If Hegel is right, there is
no determination
that is merely the expression of a thing’s intrinsic being;
it is also the expression of all the things that that thing comes into contact
with.
Alteration of Determination and Constitution
Determinateness is at the same time moment, but it contains at the same time the qualitative distinction of being different from being-in-itself, of being the negative of the something, another existence. This determinateness which thus holds the other in itself, united with the being-in-itself, introduces otherness in the latter or in determination, and determination is thereby reduced to constitution (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).
Determinateness
connects determination
and constitution
, and forms a
moment of both while both also form a moment of it. Through this bridge,
determination
is expressed in (or “reduced” to) constitution
. Or, put
differently, through determinateness
the element of constitution
is no
longer merely outside determination
but right there in it. This begins to
show how not only determination
and constitution
are connected, but also how
one turns into the other.
Conversely, the being-for-other, isolated as constitution and posited on its own, is in it the same as what the other as such is, the other in it, that is, the other of itself; but it consequently is self-referring existence, thus being-in-itself with a determinateness, therefore determination (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).
Constitution
is explicitly being-for-other
on its own, such that while it
expresses the being-for-other
of the other, it nevertheless has a
being-in-itself
through its unity of being the other
, which in turn is
distinct from this other being in it. In this regard, the constituted being
has its own determination
that distinguishes it from the determination
of
the other, and this distinguishing establishes a determinateness
.
This tighter coupling between the categories in questions implies that there is
nothing in something
that is immune to being changed. Everything in the
something
is open to be determined through another. As Hegel confirms:
“constitution belongs to that which something is in itself: something alters
along with its constitution” (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).
Change is no longer viewed as merely external to something
, but cut through
into its intrinsic being. To illustrate, the constitution of a nation may be
regarded as the source of its determination, but times may change and events may
unfold whereby the constitution becomes altered by the spirit of the times,
which sets the groundwork for another determination to evolve from it in the
future. Where in this is the real identity of the nation, or the real identity
of the thing in question, if neither determination nor constitution really hold
the primacy but form, rather, a dance of equilibrium?
Sublation of Determination and Constitution
If determination
and constitution
logically lead into one another, neither
is independent from the other and they both form moments of a new context.
However, there is presently no context that specifically contains these, so the
logic reverts back to the minimal form of determinacy, which is existence
. In
other words, the logic of something
has proved to have a determination
and
constitution
, but each of these terms bleed into one another, as it were, such
that there is no true determination
that does not also have a constitution
and vice versa, which effectively means that these terms fail to adequately
express the intrinsic vis-à-vis extrinsic being of something
.
The transition of determination and constitution into each other is at first the sublation of their distinction, and existence or something in general is thereby posited; moreover, since this something in general results from a distinction that also includes qualitative otherness within it, there are two somethings (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).
The development falls back into existence
—the minimally determinate
being—which re-develops back to something
. However, in contrast to the
first development of
something
—which also saw the development of the mediated something
as the other
—the something
that emerges here carries with it the
development of
something
and other
and determination
and constitution
, such that the other
is no longer
viewed as separate from the something
but as vital to the determination of
its intrinsic being. In other words, negation is now immanent to the nature of
being something
. As Hegel elaborates:
But these are, with respect to each other, not just others in general, so that this negation would still be abstract and would occur only in the comparison of the two; rather the negation now is immanent to the somethings (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).
Hegel then distinguishes something
and other
as merely existing in contrast
to their affirmation. Something
is affirmed when it has returned to itself
through the mediation of the otherness that is latent in it. So one could say
that a thing is more real when it is understood to be distinguished through the
process in which it inheres. The process, or relation to the other
, is
logically bound to the reality of the thing, which has previously been expressed
as its constitution
and determination
. Affirmation, then, here seems to be a
fuller development of quality
, reality
and negation
, since it exhibits the
something
as being determinate through the negation, not as merely apart
from it, but within.
As existing, they are indifferent to each other, but this, their affirmation, is no longer immediate: each refers itself to itself through the intermediary of the sublation of the otherness which in determination is reflected into the in-itselfness (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).
The “in-itselfness” or being-in-itself
is forwarded by determination
, which
in turn is connected through determinateness
to constitution
, such that the
inner is connected to the outer in a two-fold manner; the outer has a being of
its own whilst also enjoying a being within the inner, which forms a moment of
the inner as such. In this way, the something
refers itself to itself, as
Hegel claims, by rendering explicit how the outer is already a part of the inner
and the inner the outer.
The Other Within
Hegel continues to focus on the moment of how the outer being or
being-for-other
is within something
, serving as its affirmation, whilst also
retaining an independent being from it.
Something behaves in this way in relation to the other through itself; since otherness is posited in it as its own moment, its in-itselfness holds negation in itself, and it now has its affirmative existence through its intermediary alone. But the other is also qualitatively distinguished from this affirmative existence and is thus posited outside the something (Hegel 2010, 97-8/21.113).
But the interdependence of something
and other
means that each really is
what it is through the other. As Hegel confirms: “The negation of its other is
only the quality of the something, for it is in this sublation of its other that
it is something. The other, for its part, truly confronts an existence only with
this sublation” (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113). It is through the other’s sublation
that each comes to be what they are.
Hegel then claims that from the interdependence of something
and other
it
follows that each category has transitioned into the other.
…since the two are in fact inherently joined together, that is, according to their concept, their connectedness consists in this, that existence has passed over into otherness, something into other; that something is just as much an other as the other is (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).
With this transition in mind, Hegel continues to point out that each category is
the ceasing of the being of an other in it. In other words, once something
has
transitioned into being the other
, there is strictly nothing of something
left; and once other
has transitioned to be something
, the other
ceases
entirely to be. As Hegel asserts:
Now in so far as the in-itselfness is the non-being of the otherness that is contained in it but is at the same time also distinct as existent, something is itself negation, the ceasing to be of an other in it; it is posited as behaving negatively in relation to the other and in so doing preserving itself (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).
To sum up, through the development of determination
and constitution
it is
seen how being-for-other
and being-in-itself
are more closely intertwined,
which in turn redefined the relationship of something
and other
: the latter
are no longer merely isolated and cleanly separable but interdependent whereby
each exist inasmuch as the other has sublated itself and made itself a moment of
the other’s self-reference. Further, this self-reference actively depends not
only on the other having made itself a moment but also that that moment is
negated by the thing in question. Through this it has been made explicit,
then, that for something
to be, it is necessary that it refers to other
as a
moment it excludes from its intrinsic being.
Aliqulux Obscurans
This other, the in-itselfness of the something as negation of the negation, is the something’s being-in-itself, and this sublation is as simple negation at the same time in it, namely, as its negation of the other something external to it (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).
Hegel repeats that the other
is connected to the intrinsic being
(being-in-itself
) of something
, but that exactly this feature is negated,
such that the connection something
has to this other
(on which it depends)
is excluded. Notice, however, that exclusion here does not mean complete
severance or elimination of that connection; logically the connection is still
there but it is made implicit rather than explicit.
This understanding of how something
is made implicit retroactively establishes
how it was possible that something
and other
were at one point indeed viewed
as separate and interchangeable, owing in large part to the immediacy of their
determination, which it is now understood follows from the negation of the
relation to the other
. The other
is vital to the being of something
, but
in being something
, the latter’s immediacy has obscured the mediation on
which it depends. Putting it figuratively, it is, paradoxically, the light of
something's
being that darkens the relations to its other
.
Reaching the Limit
It is one determinateness of the two somethings that, on the one hand, as negation of the negation, is identical with the in-itselfness of the somethings, and also, on the other hand, since these negations are to each other as other somethings, joins them together of their own accord and, since each negation negates the other, equally separates them (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).
Previously it was seen how determination
and constitution
are connected
through determinateness
. It was then shown how the
determination-constitution
pair turn into one another, which in turn deepened
the connection that something
has to its other
. If this development is taken
within the context of determinateness
, then it serves to both join the two
somethings
and separate them. With these additional steps, Hegel appears to
recast determinateness
as limit
.
Limit
thus already comes built in with the understanding of how the other
is
intertwined with the something
, how each of these render themselves as a
moment of the other and, finally, how each is established in the negation of the
moment of the other
within it. Additionally, limit
is not the mere negation
of the other
within something
, but also the negation of negation
(a
something
), and as such expands with its own qualitative being between the two
somethings
. This last establishes the limit
with its own internal being.
Bibliography
- Hegel, G.W.F. 2010. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic. Translated by George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Authors
Filip Niklas (2025)