The Development of Constitution

Externally Determined

The category constitution (Beschaffenheit) is made explicit in the development of determination and concerns the outward being or being-for-other that falls beyond the intrinsic being—being-in-itself—of something. Basically, it concerns that part of the relationship that something has with others that it does not govern or form part of its determination.

Constituted in this or that way, the something is caught up in external influences and in external relationships. This external connection on which the constitution depends, and the being determined through an other, appear as something accidental. But it is the quality of the something to be given over to this externality and to have a constitution (Hegel 2010, 96/21.111).

Hegel makes clear that the fact that something has external relationships beyond its control—which appear for that reason as accidents—is not itself an accident or something externally determined. It belongs to the nature of something to determine itself through relations with others, but that this is a double-edged sword, so to speak, since it necessarily involves what is determined by the other. For that reason, if something has determination, it must therefore also be externally constituted.

Change in Constitution

In so far as something alters, the alteration falls on the side of its constitution; the latter is that in the something which becomes an other. The something itself preserves itself in the alteration; the latter affects only this unstable surface of the something’s otherness, not its determination (Hegel 2010, 96/21.112).

When something changes, according to Hegel, the change does not encompass the entire thing. If that were so, it would simply be another thing and effectively no change would really take place. Instead, a reference to something must be maintained for change to be meaningful. But, conversely, a reference to what is utterly other to something must likewise be made, since there is a new element that is at play which differentiates one state of something to another.

Hegel claims that this element of change is contained under the constitution of the thing. For example, Arnold is in bad shape but decides to do something about it and goes to the gym regularly to become fit. In this example, whether in bad or good shape, Arnold is still the same person (the same something), however, something fundamental about Arnold really has changed; he demonstrated his determination to be healthy by exercising (or, conversely, taking his health for granted by not exercising). Being in good or bad shape are rather themselves contingent, as neither intrinsically belong to Arnold as such insofar as Arnold is simply to be. These therefore form part of Arnold’s constitution and is seen how his determination is mediated through it.

Being-in-the-something

Hegel further develops the relation and difference between constitution and determination, starting from how the latter is indifferent to the former.

Determination and constitution are thus distinct from each other; something, according to its determination, is indifferent to its constitution. But that which the something has in it is the middle term of this syllogism connecting the two, determination and constitution. Or, rather, the being-in-the-something showed itself to fall apart into these two extremes (Hegel 2010, 96/21.112).

Recall that something has a outward being or a being that is related to others (being-for-other), and that this outward being is further subdivided into, on the one hand, what is beholden to the something (its being-in-itself) in question , and on the other hand, what is externally determined by other. These two outwardly related forms of being are respectively classed as determination and constitution. Now, what connects the determination and constitution? Hegel claims it is what the something has “in it” that connects these two and that is provisionally called being-in-the-something. But what really is such a being if not another something?

At first, Hegel defines this being-in-the-something generically as “determinateness as such” (Bestimmtheit als solche):

The simple middle term is determinateness as such; its identity belongs to determination just as well as to constitution (Hegel 2010, 96-7/21.112).

Determinateness, which presumably means it is minimally a form quality, is that in which both determination and constitution partake.

Hegel goes on to elaborate on the connection:

The connection, upon closer consideration, is this: in so far as that which something is in itself is also in it, the something is affected with being-for-other; determination is therefore open, as such, to the relation with other (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).

By way of simple inference, if determination and constitution are connected by a point of identity, then the thing’s determination not only points outward from the thing itself, but that external reality also points inward into the thing itself. The very determination of a thing is exposed to being affected by the other.

This implication found in determination that it is open to be affected externally aligns well with everyday intuitions about how things and people grow and develop. It is ingrained in everyday thinking that what something is or who someone is, depends in large part of outside influences. Indeed, where one is born proves to constitute either a formidable advantage or grave disadvantage. Hegel claims to prove this to be the case, however, ontologically, such that it forms not only part of historically lived, concrete reality but any being’s determination—including metaphysical categories, as well as fundamental qualities of natural or social reality. If Hegel is right, there is no determination that is merely the expression of a thing’s intrinsic being; it is also the expression of all the things that that thing comes into contact with.

Alteration of Determination and Constitution

Determinateness is at the same time moment, but it contains at the same time the qualitative distinction of being different from being-in-itself, of being the negative of the something, another existence. This determinateness which thus holds the other in itself, united with the being-in-itself, introduces otherness in the latter or in determination, and determination is thereby reduced to constitution (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).

Determinateness connects determination and constitution, and forms a moment of both while both also form a moment of it. Through this bridge, determination is expressed in (or “reduced” to) constitution. Or, put differently, through determinateness the element of constitution is no longer merely outside determination but right there in it. This begins to show how not only determination and constitution are connected, but also how one turns into the other.

Conversely, the being-for-other, isolated as constitution and posited on its own, is in it the same as what the other as such is, the other in it, that is, the other of itself; but it consequently is self-referring existence, thus being-in-itself with a determinateness, therefore determination (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).

Constitution is explicitly being-for-other on its own, such that while it expresses the being-for-other of the other, it nevertheless has a being-in-itself through its unity of being the other, which in turn is distinct from this other being in it. In this regard, the constituted being has its own determination that distinguishes it from the determination of the other, and this distinguishing establishes a determinateness.

This tighter coupling between the categories in questions implies that there is nothing in something that is immune to being changed. Everything in the something is open to be determined through another. As Hegel confirms: “constitution belongs to that which something is in itself: something alters along with its constitution” (Hegel 2010, 97/21.112).

Change is no longer viewed as merely external to something, but cut through into its intrinsic being. To illustrate, the constitution of a nation may be regarded as the source of its determination, but times may change and events may unfold whereby the constitution becomes altered by the spirit of the times, which sets the groundwork for another determination to evolve from it in the future. Where in this is the real identity of the nation, or the real identity of the thing in question, if neither determination nor constitution really hold the primacy but form, rather, a dance of equilibrium?

Sublation of Determination and Constitution

If determination and constitution logically lead into one another, neither is independent from the other and they both form moments of a new context. However, there is presently no context that specifically contains these, so the logic reverts back to the minimal form of determinacy, which is existence. In other words, the logic of something has proved to have a determination and constitution, but each of these terms bleed into one another, as it were, such that there is no true determination that does not also have a constitution and vice versa, which effectively means that these terms fail to adequately express the intrinsic vis-à-vis extrinsic being of something.

The transition of determination and constitution into each other is at first the sublation of their distinction, and existence or something in general is thereby posited; moreover, since this something in general results from a distinction that also includes qualitative otherness within it, there are two somethings (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).

The development falls back into existence—the minimally determinate being—which re-develops back to something. However, in contrast to the first development of something—which also saw the development of the mediated something as the other—the something that emerges here carries with it the development of something and other and determination and constitution, such that the other is no longer viewed as separate from the something but as vital to the determination of its intrinsic being. In other words, negation is now immanent to the nature of being something. As Hegel elaborates:

But these are, with respect to each other, not just others in general, so that this negation would still be abstract and would occur only in the comparison of the two; rather the negation now is immanent to the somethings (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).

Hegel then distinguishes something and other as merely existing in contrast to their affirmation. Something is affirmed when it has returned to itself through the mediation of the otherness that is latent in it. So one could say that a thing is more real when it is understood to be distinguished through the process in which it inheres. The process, or relation to the other, is logically bound to the reality of the thing, which has previously been expressed as its constitution and determination. Affirmation, then, here seems to be a fuller development of quality, reality and negation, since it exhibits the something as being determinate through the negation, not as merely apart from it, but within.

As existing, they are indifferent to each other, but this, their affirmation, is no longer immediate: each refers itself to itself through the intermediary of the sublation of the otherness which in determination is reflected into the in-itselfness (Hegel 2010, 97/21.113).

The “in-itselfness” or being-in-itself is forwarded by determination, which in turn is connected through determinateness to constitution, such that the inner is connected to the outer in a two-fold manner; the outer has a being of its own whilst also enjoying a being within the inner, which forms a moment of the inner as such. In this way, the something refers itself to itself, as Hegel claims, by rendering explicit how the outer is already a part of the inner and the inner the outer.

The Other Within

Hegel continues to focus on the moment of how the outer being or being-for-other is within something, serving as its affirmation, whilst also retaining an independent being from it.

Something behaves in this way in relation to the other through itself; since otherness is posited in it as its own moment, its in-itselfness holds negation in itself, and it now has its affirmative existence through its intermediary alone. But the other is also qualitatively distinguished from this affirmative existence and is thus posited outside the something (Hegel 2010, 97-8/21.113).

But the interdependence of something and other means that each really is what it is through the other. As Hegel confirms: “The negation of its other is only the quality of the something, for it is in this sublation of its other that it is something. The other, for its part, truly confronts an existence only with this sublation” (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113). It is through the other’s sublation that each comes to be what they are.

Hegel then claims that from the interdependence of something and other it follows that each category has transitioned into the other.

…since the two are in fact inherently joined together, that is, according to their concept, their connectedness consists in this, that existence has passed over into otherness, something into other; that something is just as much an other as the other is (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).

With this transition in mind, Hegel continues to point out that each category is the ceasing of the being of an other in it. In other words, once something has transitioned into being the other, there is strictly nothing of something left; and once other has transitioned to be something, the other ceases entirely to be. As Hegel asserts:

Now in so far as the in-itselfness is the non-being of the otherness that is contained in it but is at the same time also distinct as existent, something is itself negation, the ceasing to be of an other in it; it is posited as behaving negatively in relation to the other and in so doing preserving itself (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).

To sum up, through the development of determination and constitution it is seen how being-for-other and being-in-itself are more closely intertwined, which in turn redefined the relationship of something and other: the latter are no longer merely isolated and cleanly separable but interdependent whereby each exist inasmuch as the other has sublated itself and made itself a moment of the other’s self-reference. Further, this self-reference actively depends not only on the other having made itself a moment but also that that moment is negated by the thing in question. Through this it has been made explicit, then, that for something to be, it is necessary that it refers to other as a moment it excludes from its intrinsic being.

Aliqulux Obscurans

This other, the in-itselfness of the something as negation of the negation, is the something’s being-in-itself, and this sublation is as simple negation at the same time in it, namely, as its negation of the other something external to it (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).

Hegel repeats that the other is connected to the intrinsic being (being-in-itself) of something, but that exactly this feature is negated, such that the connection something has to this other (on which it depends) is excluded. Notice, however, that exclusion here does not mean complete severance or elimination of that connection; logically the connection is still there but it is made implicit rather than explicit.

This understanding of how something is made implicit retroactively establishes how it was possible that something and other were at one point indeed viewed as separate and interchangeable, owing in large part to the immediacy of their determination, which it is now understood follows from the negation of the relation to the other. The other is vital to the being of something, but in being something, the latter’s immediacy has obscured the mediation on which it depends. Putting it figuratively, it is, paradoxically, the light of something's being that darkens the relations to its other.

Reaching the Limit

It is one determinateness of the two somethings that, on the one hand, as negation of the negation, is identical with the in-itselfness of the somethings, and also, on the other hand, since these negations are to each other as other somethings, joins them together of their own accord and, since each negation negates the other, equally separates them (Hegel 2010, 98/21.113).

Previously it was seen how determination and constitution are connected through determinateness. It was then shown how the determination-constitution pair turn into one another, which in turn deepened the connection that something has to its other. If this development is taken within the context of determinateness, then it serves to both join the two somethings and separate them. With these additional steps, Hegel appears to recast determinateness as limit.

Limit thus already comes built in with the understanding of how the other is intertwined with the something, how each of these render themselves as a moment of the other and, finally, how each is established in the negation of the moment of the other within it. Additionally, limit is not the mere negation of the other within something, but also the negation of negation (a something), and as such expands with its own qualitative being between the two somethings. This last establishes the limit with its own internal being.

Bibliography

Authors
Filip Niklas (2025)